The main goal of this article is to analyse the political risk of Russia with a special emphasis on Kaliningrad. In this study, political risks are assessed using the normative model of macro political risk assessment developed by Alon and Martin in 1998. In this model, political risks are divided into government-, society-and economy-related variables. 
too hopeful for future development. Even if all the parties representing the liberal opposition would join together, it is very unlikely that they would go over the electoral threshold of seven per cent. Moreover, one should not forget that the tenure of the parliamentary term and presidency have been prolonged, pushing Russia's political system towards political immobility.
The likelihood of immediate regime change is extremely low, even if the crisis has touched the Russian economy hard. "Political risk has increased, reflecting the pressures created by the severe financial and economic crisis. The ' The ideology of this wing will be fortified'" (Guardian 2009 ).
In May 2008, the Russian Government passed the law restricting foreign investment into strategic sectors. The law was not prepared with sufficient time, and even Russian experts admit that there are several weaknesses in the law. For instance, the law could lead to an absurd situation where foreign-owned oil companies stop exploring new oil fields, since if they will find too a big hydrocarbon field they should donate it to the state against a symbolic compensation (Malkova 2009; Medetsky 2009b ). In addition, there are loopholes in the law that allow foreign entities to flout the government when buying into strategic companies (Medetsky 2009a ). Some Russian authorities have acknowledged that the law touches unnecessary sectors and ownership restrictions are too strict, and hence, the authorities may increase the ownership stakes of foreign oil firms in strategic fields. Although it would be wise to re-consider the content of the law, one may only ask whether the possible liberalisation in the law lasts only during the crisis or whether foreign firms can really rely on the law in the longer run (Argus 2009a).
Society-related risks: one can argue that Russian society has become more fragmented and nationalism grows. Pain (2007, 5) The prolonged and extended instability of Chechnya has turned the Caucasus into a fertile soil for Islamist fundamentalism, and therefore, it is likely that the assassinations and bombings will become more frequent. "Responsi-
bility for most of the terror attacks has been claimed by underground Islamic armed organisations, and especially the Chechen commander Dokka Umarov. The declared objective of the Islamic militants, who are likely associated with international terror organisations, is to overthrow the local authorities, separate the Caucasian republics from Russia and establish a Caucasus Emirate in their territories, with Sharia law as its legal system" (EW 2009, 5).
Should the Russian Government be unable to normalise life in the Caucasus region (unemployment, for instance, in Ingushetia is around 80 per cent), one may anticipate that Islamist fundamentalism does not only spread inside the Caucasus, but fundamentalism may find its targets outside the Caucasus (BEE 2009b). With the current trend the Caucasus will soon become the Middle-East of Russia, where investments, be they domestic or foreign ones, are doomed to fail.
The world's public opinion towards Russia has become more reserved during this decade, when Russia began to rebuild its political and economic leverage in the post-Soviet territory. After three gas transit conflicts with Belarus and Ukraine the public image of Russia has particularly deteriorated in the West. After the war with Georgia and the increased assassinations of journalists investigating the Chechnya conflict, public opinion on Russia has dropped to its record low.
According to a large international survey (BBC 2009) 1 , positive views have fallen 5 percentage points (30 %, down from 35 %) and negatives have risen sharply (42 %, up from 34 %). Positive views about Russia have deteriorated substantially, especially in Europe and the United States. In the United Kingdom, positive views have fallen 23 percentage points (25 %, down from 45 %), shifting the overall leaning to predominantly negative from positive. Negative views have worsened in France (rising from 50 % to 66 %) and Germany (rising from 56 % to 70 %). In the United States negative views have risen 28 points (64 %, up from 36 %), shifting overall views from mildly positive (45 % to 18 %) to strongly negative. The only countries to demonstrate significant improvement in positive views of Russia are Italy (34 %, up from 23 %) and Ghana (50 %, up from 42 %). Italy's several bilateral deals with Russia and Prime Minister Berlusconi's dominance over the media may explain a part of the aforementioned development. The survey administrator concluded that the more Russia acts like the old Soviet Union, the less people outside its borders seem to like it.
Economy-related risks: Russia's GDP per capita growth has been remarkable in this decade. Until the crisis broke, the average growth was clearly above 5 per cent annually. Though the Russian GDP has nearly doubled in this decade, some citizens have been more equal than others in amassing prosperity. The richest 10 per cent of the Russian population earn over 30 per cent of all the income distributed in Russia, while the poorest 10 per cent earn less than three per cent. On the other hand, the USA does not perform better than Russia in the Gini index (UNDP 2008 (Harding 2009 ).
Differences among the Russian regions are notable. The regional GDP per capita comparison does not describe the situation accurately since the natural resource rich regions seldom receive the major part of the income from the exploitation of these resources. Despite the statistical deficiencies, one can safely conclude that Russia lives in three different centuries. Moscow and St. Petersburg are hectic metropoles of the 21 st century, regional capitals and several industrial centres live in the past century, whereas some regions have degenerated back to the 19 th century. The current crisis will add to regional inequality since there are hundreds of towns in which one corporation is practically responsible for the economic well-being of the whole city. The Russian Government has identified 400 towns that rely almost exclusively on one employer. The substantial increase in regional unemployment, and hence, the considerable drop in economic well-being will obviously cause social turbulence Russia has not seen since the beginning of the 1990's. In addition to unemployment, the grey economy, absenteeism and criminality can be expected to increase in these monocities (Pismennaya 2009; Vasilyeva 2009 ).
Besides regional inequality, societal inequality is wide. Elderly people particularly have suffered from the transformation from socialism to capitalism. One can even state that elderly people have been betrayed by both socialism and capitalism, since neither socialism nor capitalism has brought them the well-being promised. Although 'the lost generation' feels disappointed, it is too old to cause violent protests on the streets and too wise to re-elect the communists into power.
Even if the social pressure is to grow during the next winter, the social protests have so far remained mild. Lankina and Savrasov (2009, 6-8) The Russian leadership are sensitive towards social protests in Kaliningrad, as the leaders may be afraid that the independence movement in the region would grow in this Russian exclave sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland. A major protest in Kaliningrad in January 2010 could be anticipated, since the living costs of the citizens and the regional unemployment are increasing.
The people supporting independence represent a small proportion of Kaliningrad's population. The young are an exception. According to Kortunov (2005) 
